Most of the worlds' marine fisheries are overexploited or endangered, including the New England 30 groundfishery, once one of the world's most prolific. After 35 years of management, stock sizes and 31 catches are lower now than ever. We argue that New England groundfishermen are caught in a prisoner's 32 dilemma, from which they have failed to escape. We then suggest a set of policies to get these 33 groudnfishermen out of their dilemma. 34
Introduction

36
The 21st century is opening on the specter of massive fisheries failure. Fully 69% of the 37 world's marine fisheries are exploited at a level at or beyond the level corresponding to 38 maximum sustainable yield (MSY) (Garcia and Newton 1997) . One of those is the 39 groundfisheries of the Gulf of Maine, once one of the world's most prolific fisheries. 40 Groundfishing was the New World's earliest industry. Although this fishery has been under 41 management for decades, the size of the stocks now is far smaller than it was when management 42 began. What we are witnessing is both stock failure and management failure. In this paper, we 43 will focus on answering the question: Why has groundfish management failed? As we shall see, 44 groundfishermen are caught in a prisoner's dilemma, from which that have failed to escape. Until 45 they do escape, this fishery will continue its downward spiral. (1) 58 It pays if every fisherman follows conservation rule II.
59
If things were this simple, then the fishermen would just adopt conservation rule II and there 60 would be no downward spiral. This is where the dilemma comes in. The idea here is that the full benefit b of following conservation rule II is only achieved if 68 everyone in the fishery follows that rule. Otherwise, the benefit is proportional to the number 69 following the rule. If everyone follows conservation rule I, then X = 0 and the payoff for each 70 fisherman is 0. There are two cases to consider, depending on whether b/n > c or b/n < c.
71
When b/n > c, fisherman I has an incentive to follow conservation rule II even if no one 72 else does. His payoff is (1/n)b -c > 0, which is better than conservation rule I pays. This 73 inequality applies to every player, and the result is a Nash equilibrium x* of the game with x*(i) 74 = 1 for every fisherman. The benefit to conservation rule II is so great that every fisherman 75 adopts it on his own. Unfortunately for the New English fishery, this is not the case that applies.
76
Now suppose b/n < c . Fisherman I has no incentive to follow conservation rule II if no 77 one else does. since (1/n)b -c < 0, which he would get from following conservation rule I.
78
So there is a Nash equilibrium x* with x*(i) = 0 for all i. Plus, the same algebra applies to values 79 of X greater than 0. So the Nash equilibrium we have identified is unique. This is the Prisoner's 80 Dilemma the fishermen face: x*(i) = 0 for all I is a strictly dominant strategy that leads to an 81 inefficient outcome.
82
It is hard to get out of a prisoner's dilemma, as the experience of these fishermen will 83 show. The most popular way theoretically is to let the players play the game repeatedly forever.
84
In this case, if they are sufficiently patient, then there exists a Nash equilibrium supporting 85 conservation rule II. Unfortunately, these fishermen don't have the luxury of infinity---the fish 86 won't last that long. A way that often works experimentally is to let the subjects communicate 87 with each other; they talk their way out of the dilemma. England played a prominent role in that industry (Lear 1998 Groundfish stocks are in worse shape today than they were when management began.
164
It would take several volumes to discuss every facet of groundfish management in detail.
165
In this section, we will cover only the most important groundfish management plans, the political 166 pressures bringing them about, the management tools employed, and the results. 
176
The TMQ plan created a good deal of opposition in the industry, due in great part to the 177 fact that the regional council used its closure powers repeatedly so that one day it would be legal 178 to catch fish, the next day it would not. Rules changed so rapidly that a crisis atmosphere was 179 created, and fishermen had a hard time keeping up with them (Barlow 1978 ). The fishermen not 180 only lobbied against the TMQ plan, but also cheated massively (Acheson 1984) . By the summer 181 of 1979, many fishermen and council members had to admit they did not know how many fish 182 were being caught; the TMQ was a failure.
183
After several months of discussion, the council decided to impose an -interim plan,‖ 184 which was intended to last only for a short time until a permanent plan could be put in place. Its more than 50%‖ (Stevens 1989:46) . At this point, the council began to appreciate the seriousness 217 of the situation, but it still acquiesced to the demands of industry for lenient rules (Stevens 1988 where, by 1986, they considerably reduced the stocks of groundfish (Lannin 1988) . While the 238 NMFS and the council were attempting to limit fishing effort, the actions of the international 239 court and the loan agencies had the opposite effect (Acheson 1984) . 
Industry Opposition
258
The industry lobbied the council continuously to get rules it could live with, but failed. other types of groundfishermen (Plante 1998a (Plante , 1998b 
380
We can draw several conclusions about the attitudes of groundfishermen from these data, 381 conclusions that give insight into the difficulty the council faced in crafting a plan acceptable to 382 the industry. Third, there was no support for the kinds of regulations that the regional council and 392 NMFS had put in place in the first plan. Only 1% said they wanted a quota. More fishermen 393 preferred rules on how fishing was done rather than how much fishing could be done.
394
A large number of the fishermen interviewed recognized that the stocks were in 395 difficulty, but they had serious doubts about the ability of the government and political system to 396 solve the problems faced by the industry. They were pessimistic about the future of their industry 397 and the ability of the government to address its problems. that groundfishermen have about the poor quality of science and the ineffectiveness of the rules. In the groundfishery, catches had been falling for decades, and fishermen were sure that 528 the managers were using strategies that would be ineffective so that stocks would not likely 529 increase. Under these circumstances, fishermen have every incentive to take the fish stocks now. 
